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Cybersecurity·3 min read

Optimizely Breach Exposes 178 Brands to Script Malware

Attackers injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web snippets, compromising sites like Zoom, BBC, and GitLab to steal payment cards and crypto.

TL;DR

  • Attackers injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web experimentation projects, affecting site visitors across 178 major organizations [^1].
  • The payload skimmed payment cards, hijacked cryptocurrency addresses, stole cookies and screenshots, and deployed iOS exploit kits [^1].

Background

Modern websites routinely load third-party scripts from external software-as-a-service providers to run analytics, marketing tests, and user interface experiments. Rather than self-hosting all application logic, organizations embed small code snippets provided by third-party vendors directly into their web pages. While this architecture allows rapid experimentation, it also creates supply-chain vulnerability vectors: if an attacker modifies script content at the vendor level, downstream websites execute the malicious code in visitors' browsers.

What happened

On November 16, 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors across 178 organizations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform [^1]. The compromise affected high-profile websites including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock, as well as Optimizely's own web properties [^1]. Out of 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets analyzed by researchers, 188 snippets were found infected [^1].

The attack targeted an optional custom code field within Optimizely projects known as Project JavaScript (projectJS), which executes custom code on every page [^1]. Attackers wrote malicious code directly into customer project configurations while leaving the remainder of Optimizely's CDN-served files untouched [^1]. The script loaders appeared in three variants, including plain <script> tags targeting https://1688360.cc/track.js, base64-encoded strings using atob(), and inline payload copies evaluated via eval [^1].

Once executed in a user's browser, the multi-purpose payload monitored page activity to hijack cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim payment card data from non-iframe web forms, steal non-HttpOnly cookies, render page screenshots via html2canvas, and serve the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits to iOS devices [^1]. By 19:25 UTC on November 16, the attackers' wallets had received approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency over roughly nine hours [^1]. A mass cleanup occurred later that evening, reducing active infections to 1 of 188 infected snippets by 21:52 UTC [^1].

Why it matters

This incident highlights how third-party JavaScript dependencies can bypass traditional perimeter security and trusted domain boundaries. Because the malicious code was delivered directly through legitimate Optimizely CDN endpoints with valid certificates, browser security mechanisms and site operators treated the traffic as trusted content [^1]. Compromising customer project settings enabled the attackers to execute code inside victim browsers without needing to breach the primary infrastructure of the affected organizations [^1].

The attack also demonstrates the rapid evolution of browser-based threat payloads. During the day, the attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times to add features and cryptocurrency wallets [^1]. Organizations relying on external JavaScript platforms can enforce Content Security Policies and subresource monitoring to identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript and block external connections [^1].

Practical example

Say Elena manages web operations for an online retail portal.

Elena's team embeds an Optimizely Web snippet on their site to run user interface experiments, trusting scripts served directly from cdn.optimizely.com [^1]. During the compromise, an attacker gains unauthorized access to customer project settings in Optimizely and injects code into the projectJS configuration [^1].

When a customer visits Elena's store, their browser loads the trusted Optimizely file containing injected instructions pointing to https://1688360.cc/track.js [^1]. As the shopper enters their payment card information into a standard web form, the injected script captures the Luhn-validated card number, expiration date, and CVV before transmitting them to https://1688360.cc/card.php via navigator.sendBeacon [^1].

If the customer opens their cryptocurrency wallet in another tab, the script intercepts the system clipboard and swaps their destination address with the attacker's wallet address [^1]. Once Elena's team notices suspicious outbound network traffic to unrecognized external domains, they clean their Optimizely project settings [^1]. To prevent future incidents, Elena enforces strict Content Security Policy rules that restrict external script execution and network connections [^1].

Related gear

We recommend this classic guide for security teams analyzing third-party Web dependencies and application injection vulnerabilities.

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The Web Application Hacker's Handbook

Sources

  1. [1]Report URI Blog — World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
  2. [2]Hacker News — Optimizely compromised, served malware on Zoom, GitLab